EMET NEWS PRESS

Key Findings

Germany’s right-wing extremist threat environment combines a large extremist personnel base, sustained violence orientation, digitally accelerated mobilisation and regionally capable political-extremist linkage spaces.

The right-wing extremist spectrum comprised 58,700 persons in 2025. Of these, 15,600 were assessed as violence-oriented. Authorities recorded 36,951 offences with a right-wing extremist background, including 1,395 violent offences.

The AfD’s nationwide parliamentary, organisational and digital presence creates a politically relevant resonance environment in which narratives can gain wider visibility and may be adopted, intensified or operationalised by actors in the broader right-wing extremist spectrum.

The decisive operational requirement is the early identification of regional convergence zones where political visibility, extremist networks, digital amplification, local mobilisation capacity and concrete intimidation or violence indicators coincide.

The Essentials in 30 Seconds

The NATO Summit in Ankara on 7–8 July 2026 will formalise a revised Alliance burden architecture. The United States is expected to reaffirm its commitment to Article 5 while reducing selected conventional capability allocations within the NATO Force Model.

European Allies and Canada have largely compensated for the immediate shortfalls through additional force contributions, readiness measures and alternative capability packages. The remaining high-value gaps concern strategic bombers, air-to-air refuelling, persistent ISR, maritime long-range surveillance, carrier-based naval power, sea-based long-range strike and rapid global reinforcement.

The summit will assess whether European defence expenditure can be converted into deployable formations, ammunition production, air and missile defence, command-and-control resilience, military mobility and industrial regeneration capacity.

The central operational issue is the gap between political reassurance and force availability. Article 5 remains the political foundation of collective defence. European readiness, industrial output and sustainment capacity determine the Alliance’s ability to manage simultaneous pressure in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.

Core Findings

The situation between Iran, Israel, the United States, and the Arab Gulf states is not a stable ceasefire, but a limited escalation regime carrying a high risk of relapse. De-escalation efforts rest on the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Islamabad, which establishes a 60-day window for a comprehensive agreement. Two weeks into this window, both sides continue to dispute the interpretation of the signed MOU, making a failure of the initial agreement currently appear more likely than a final settlement. Additionally, a one-week temporary truce is in place for the Strait of Hormuz; renewed clashes remain highly possible immediately after July 4.

Two structural factors dominate the negotiation landscape. First, Iran has institutionalized its claims over the Strait of Hormuz through the newly created Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). Teheran is operating a de facto transit regime featuring approved corridors, mandatory coordination with the IRGC Navy, and transit fees. Second, following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran is undergoing a leadership succession phase. Mourning ceremonies are scheduled from July 4 to July 9, and the next negotiation meeting has been postponed until their conclusion. This succession represents the primary variable affecting Iran's negotiation mandate, escalation discipline, and the internal cohesion of the Revolutionary Guards.

Militarily, Iran remains weakened—US strikes have repeatedly degraded its missile, drone, and coastal radar capabilities according to CENTCOM reports—yet strategically operational. Teheran's operational impact stems from its capacity to project power across multiple theaters simultaneously: the maritime domain (Hormuz, Persian Gulf, Red Sea), ground fronts (Northern Israel, Southern Lebanon, Iraq, Syria), the Gulf monarchies hosting US forces, and critical digital infrastructure. Israel and the United States maintain clear advantages in air power, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), target development, precision strikes, missile defense, and maritime projection. While this superiority is sufficient to repeatedly degrade Iranian infrastructure, it fails to permanently deter Iran from maritime coercion, missile reconstitution, cyber operations, or supporting terrorist and other armed proxies.

Key Judgment

Russian forces have measurably expanded their capacity for tactical adaptation since 2024, yet highly likely continue to fail at converting tactical penetrations into operational breakthroughs. From this discrepancy, eight exploitable weakness complexes emerge: the unprotected consolidation phase following infiltrations, the predictability of reconnaissance-by-force, the dependence of small assault groups on rearward connectivity, the incomplete handoffs within combined arms operations, the concentration of key personnel in centralized drone structures, the channeling of movement corridors, the exposed tactical supply chain, and the recognizable operating pattern of the glide bomb campaign. None of these complexes requires new major weapon systems to exploit; all counter-approaches rest on available means whose effect derives from prioritization and temporal compression.

Methodology and limitations: This assessment draws exclusively on open sources (RUSI, CSIS, ISW, Jamestown Foundation). Reliable Russian casualty and inventory figures are not available. Probability statements follow the scale: almost certain – highly likely – likely – possible.

Key Finding

Several unidentified drones flew in formation over a Swiss military facility. The location, time, platform type, control point and operators remain undisclosed. The military character of the protected site has been confirmed.

Tactical pre-operational reconnaissance aimed at testing detection, alarm procedures and response times is likely. An imminent sabotage or attack operation is not substantiated. There are no reliable technical or forensic indicators supporting attribution to a state actor or intelligence service.

The Chief of the Armed Forces announced a review of the existing catalogue of critical infrastructure. The Armed Forces are now recording drone sightings systematically and are examining a flight-restricted zone above the affected facility. Until integrated Counter-UAS systems are available more widely, passive protection remains the most immediately effective measure.

The Essentials in 30 Seconds

Russia treats Germany as an intelligence, influence and potential disruption environment. Military logistics, defence industry, transport, energy, digital infrastructure and political decision-making are priority target sets.

The 2025 constitutional protection report documents sabotage preparation against transport infrastructure, reconnaissance of military-relevant routes and persistent cyber access. It also identifies the use of low-level agents as a Russian operating pattern. Russian direction of extremist actors in Germany for sabotage has not been proven.

China pursues long-term strategic acquisition and influence activity against technology, research, industry and political target structures. Iran is intensifying surveillance and repression against the exile opposition, Jewish and Israeli institutions, and US-linked targets.

The Essentials in 30 Seconds

• According to the GAO, the U.S. F-35 fleet’s full mission capable rate fell to 25 percent in fiscal year 2025. Forty-four percent of aircraft were mission capable for at least one assigned task.

• Spare-parts shortages, extended depot turnaround times, limited data access, delayed software maturity and insufficient industrial capacity are constraining availability.

• Six U.S. Marine Corps F-35B aircraft were accepted without AN/APG-85 radars. Concurrency now affects a core sensor.

• For the United States and NATO, the ability to generate available F-35 units increasingly depends on the performance of the U.S.-led sustainment system.

F-35 availability constrains the United States’ ability to provide fully mission-capable air forces for sustained multi-role operations. Fleet inventory is growing while spare-parts supply, depot capacity, software maturity and technical support are not expanding at the same rate.

According to the GAO report published in June 2026, the mission capable rate of the U.S. F-35 fleet declined from 67 percent in fiscal year 2021 to 44 percent in fiscal year 2025. This metric measures aircraft able to fly and execute at least one assigned task. The full mission capable rate declined from 38 percent to 25 percent over the same period. Full mission capable status requires an aircraft to perform its complete assigned mission set without a limiting deficiency.

In fiscal year 2025, only around one quarter of the U.S. F-35 fleet could execute all assigned missions. A 44-percent mission capable rate also constrains training, alert commitments, deployment preparation and sustained operations. The shortfall affects the F-35A, F-35B and F-35C, as well as the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

The Essentials in 30 Seconds

The Netherlands is transforming its Defence Space Security Centre into a Space Command. The move consolidates satellite-based intelligence, space domain awareness, satellite communications, positioning, navigation and timing, and the processing of space-derived data within a joint military command structure.

The initiative does not create an autonomous Dutch space power. It is intended to connect national satellites, ground infrastructure, commercial services and allied data for maritime surveillance, air defence, intelligence support and NATO operations.

A limited initial operational capability is likely by 2028. A resilient 24/7 operational structure with trained shift teams, protected ground segments, independent data fusion and routine NATO integration will depend primarily on personnel recruitment and the maturity of operational data chains.

The Essentials in 30 Seconds

Sweden plans to activate its new civilian foreign intelligence service, Sveriges utrikes underrättelsetjänst (UND), on 1 January 2027. Parts of the foreign intelligence function currently held by MUST are expected to transfer into the new structure.

MUST Chief Lieutenant General Thomas Nilsson has identified the implementation timetable as an operational risk. During Almedalen Week in Visby, he stated that Sweden could not afford to “drop the ball” under current security conditions. A reform of this scale could reduce operational effectiveness; that reduction must not reach a level that degrades ongoing intelligence production.

The transition affects the same personnel, technical access, and international liaison arrangements that MUST requires for Russia intelligence, military early warning, Baltic Sea situational awareness, and NATO support. The reform may strengthen strategic intelligence support to the government over time. Until early 2027, it creates a capability risk if personnel, SIGINT access, and liaison procedures are removed prematurely from military intelligence work.

The Essentials in 30 Seconds

• A Russian attack on Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania would place NATO and the European Union in a simultaneous collective-defence and mutual-assistance crisis.

• Switzerland and Austria would remain formally neutral. Both states would nonetheless become part of a European conflict environment shaped by transit, infrastructure, cyber defence, defence industry, energy security and counter-intelligence.

• Austria would be legally obliged under Article 42(7) TEU to provide aid and assistance. The neutrality reservation limits the form of assistance; it does not create a cost-free option of political non-involvement.

• Switzerland could restrict militarily relevant support more extensively. Its 2022 and 2023 re-export policy nevertheless demonstrated that European partners can treat Swiss defence goods and components as an availability risk.

• Russia’s objective would not primarily be the formal abolition of neutrality. It would seek to constrain European decision-making through deterrent messaging, sabotage, cyber operations and political polarisation.